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Compared with prior engagements, commanders today are exposed to a battlespace that 
is more dynamic and less predictable. With increasing frequency, commanders are 
confronted with an array of problems whose solution requires knowledge beyond their 
military training. In these novel situations, decision makers often rely on their past 
experiences incorporating a process best described in research as analogy-based 
reasoning and/or recognition primed decision making. While the relevancy of the 
experience is based on the individual, a key goal would be to capture and exchange 
relevant experiences between individual decision makers. The shocking events of 11 
September 2001 may have been less shocking to anyone with experience serving in the 
Pacific theater of operations toward the end of World War II and experienced Kamikaze 
warfare. This paper describes work in progress at the USAF Research Laboratory 
Information Directorate to capture, develop, and provide an experience-based reasoning 
system to commanders during mixed-initiative planning. The objective of this work is to 
provide a rich database of experiences for the commander to compare to the current 
situation. The research described in this paper is aimed at developing a computational 
representation for episodic models, and reasoning on those models for retrieval and 
experience extraction. 
 
Introduction 
 
By using the experience of the past, we can seek insight on the present, and shape the 
future.  Experience-based reasoning draws upon the past in order to adapt past successes 
to current problems.  Applying this sort of reasoning to war planning is an exciting 
opportunity to tap into a powerful human process and augment that process with the 
power of technology.  By using a computer to assist in the storage, retrieval, and 
application of experience, we can enhance decision making with another take on an 
already occurring human process.  The challenge becomes knowing how to store 
experiences in a computationally reasonable way, and how to match those experiences to 
new situations as they arise.  We will explore and expand upon different technologies and 
ideas to engage this task.  First, we will explore how to store an experience itself.  Then, 
we will seek to adapt a plan representation to an episode representation to store these 
cases.  After that, we will look at different ways to pull experiences back out of the case 
base to use again.  Finally, we will look ahead to future possibilities for this research. 
 
Case Based Reasoning 
 
The primary means of experience-based reasoning we will be exploring is case-based 
reasoning.  In case-based reasoning (CBR), experiences are split up into discrete 
segments of time known as cases.  These cases contain the context of a problem, the 
solution employed, and the results of that solution.  Given a set of cases, known as a case-
base, an AI can apply the four R’s of case-based reasoning.  When a new problem arises, 
the reasoner can retrieve the most relevant cases.  Then it can reuse those cases to come 
up with a proposed solution.  Then it can revise that solution to better apply to the current 
situation.  Then, after a solution is tried, it can retain the solution and results back in the case-base.  By using these four simple steps, a case-based reasoner learns over time by 
experience, rather than formal rules.  The asset of this form of reasoning is that even if 
the solution does not succeed, that experience can be useful in the future as an example of 
what not to do.  Additionally, storing the context in which the solution was attempted can 
provide further insight later, rather than trying to strip those subtleties away from a 
solution as one would do while generalizing in a more rule-based form of AI. 
 
Modern Planning 
 
In a fast paced conflict like the GWOT, finding solutions to novel problems occurs every 
day.  Even though it’s hard to imagine looking into the past to find solutions for a conflict 
that appears so new, true insights can be gained by having a deep knowledge of the past.  
Additionally, as new solutions are found to these novel problems, using case-based 
reasoning would store those experiences for future use.  In other words, if you can best a 
tactic once, and you can always remember what you had to do, best practices can arise 
that come from the concrete ground of experience.  Rather than waiting months or years 
for a formalized counter-tactic to be devised, using case-based reasoning (especially if it 
can be done in groups) can employ the school of hard knocks to get inside of an 
adversary’s decision loop.  In other words, using case-based reasoning as a conflict 
continues allows decision makers to gain faster insight into potential approaches to a 
problem, giving them the ability to make progressively faster and more effective 
decisions. 
 
Capturing an Experience 
 
Sometimes life’s greatest lessons are learned through hard experience.  Perhaps one of 
the greatest abilities of the human mind is its sensitivity to the world around it in respect 
to time.  As we move forward, we gain new experiences which forge our beliefs, skills, 
and characters.  This is especially true a high-stress environment like battle.  How do we 
translate the experiences gathered from good (and bad) command decisions into a form 
that is understandable by a computer to use in mixed initiative planning?  For this, we 
have to turn to the field of knowledge representation, with an eye for this unique domain. 
 
To represent a commander’s decision, there are a few things that need to surround it in 
order to provide context.  First 
and foremost, the actual plan 
itself must be stored.  However, 
in a vacuum it can provide little 
insight.  We must also know why 
that plan was chosen.  First, we 
must then know what the 
commander wanted to 
accomplish; what objectives the 
commander hoped to achieve.   
Second, we must know what 
constraints were placed on the commander based on the world (s)he lives in.  The resources you have available, the 
geospatial (and non-geospatial) layout of the operations environment, and other 
dimensions which define your overall situation have a huge impact on what specific 
decisions can be made.  Finally, it’s also important to denote what was assumed by the 
commander at the time of planning.  Assumptions drive decision making to a huge 
degree, since assumptions denote the commander’s stance towards the adversary’s intent, 
the adversary’s possible actions, available intelligence information, and the proposed 
efficacy of the actions the commander undertakes.  Figure 1 shows the overall areas of 
information that need to be captured to represent a plan and its context. 
 
Once the plan is formed, the actual execution denotes how the experience actually occurs.  
To represent this, we need to capture a few different kinds of information.  First, the 
actual actions the commander’s force undertook in accordance with their plan.  Then, we 
need to know what events took place in reaction to the blue force’s actions.  In other 
words, although there was some assumption of actions other factions would take, we 
need to know what actions they actually took when the rubber hit the road. 
 
Now that we’ve captured context, plan, and actual events of the experience, we need a 
way for the case to be characterized in terms of its overall results.  We need to be able to 
characterize the outcome of the experience.  Several metrics could be used to explain the 
overall outcome of a case.  These include the objectives that were met and failed, the 
assumptions that were true and false, the costs incurred by all factions involved, and any 
plans and actions that cannot be 
undertaken due to the selection 
of this plan (opportunity cost).   
Figure 2 shows these additional 
elements in an experience. 
 
With all of these elements, we 
now have a reasonable flow of an 
experience from beginning to 
end.  Temporally, this approach 
to capturing an experience is 
agnostic; an experience from this 
perspective could be five minutes or two years.  This presents not only the challenge of 
intelligent experience capturing, but also the flexibility to formulate the exact case 
building methodology based on the specific use in mind. 
 
Objectives 
 
Understanding a decision depends heavily on what the decision was trying to accomplish.  
Knowing why someone does something can give you understanding of the action in 
relation to intention.  Otherwise, we would all appear to be acting for no reason 
whatsoever.  In order to avoid this, we need to be able to represent intent for the sake of 
reasoning.  How do we even begin to break down the mighty ‘why’ behind human 
actions?  There are a couple of different approaches we could take.  
First, we could allow the commander to articulate the ideal world state that they would 
prefer to see.  In other words, we could store the world state that has been adjusted to 
show what the mission was supposed to accomplish.  This would require that the 
commander knows exactly how they would like the world to look, with a great level of 
detail and specificity (or rather, with the same level of detail as the world state model).  
This approach could be thought of as supplying the vision, or overall goal end state. 
 
A second approach would be to allow the commander to enunciate objectives in a more 
direct, almost rule-based way.  Statements such as ‘establish air superiority’ denote a 
characterization of the end state.  In other words, there is not just one specific instance of 
the world where air superiority is established.  There are many ways to approach that 
state and many methods by which to achieve it.  Any end state, regardless of the details, 
that satisfies the objective is acceptable.  This approach leaves more flexibility for the 
decision maker, since several various world states can satisfy the objectives.  With this 
flexibility, the commander can make decisions that fit into their own situation.   
 
The computational challenge for this approach is determining how to characterize the 
overall state in such a way that we can determine if an objective has been attained.  In 
other words, how do we know that ‘establish air superiority’ has been successful?  How 
do we understand air superiority in terms that can be measured and understood by a 
computer?  In order to answer this question, we need to be able to take a natural-language 
concept like ‘establish air superiority’ and break it down into a concise meaning.   
 
Representing Information 
 
Thus, the challenge becomes: what information in a military planning situation can be 
captured and stored as a case?  To examine this question, it will take a perspective on 
what a military plan consists of, and what sort of information it depends upon.  As we 
have examined, there are several broad areas which make up an episode (Objectives, 
Assumptions, Situation, Plan, Actions, Events, Outcome).  What sort of data can we 
collect in each of these areas, and how can that data be stored in a meaningful way that 
allows us to draw analogies for episodic reasoning? 
 
Regardless of how we decide to represent Objectives, the information required will 
eventually boil down to storing a way to know when the Objective has been met.  In other 
words, while the exact information stores depends on the approach to representing intent, 
what the information should tell you (based on the nature of Objectives) is when a goal is 
accomplished. 
 
In order to properly codify our assumptions, three basic things must be recorded.  First, 
what the assumption is about.  Next, what the assumption is.  Finally, the level of 
confidence in the assumption.  The first piece of information is fairly straightforward.  
The second piece of information affords us some flexibility.  We could store information 
in an attribute-value tuple.  We could store information as plain text, relying on natural 
language processing to interpret meaning.  We could even store the entire entity itself; as to indicate that its very existence and everything about it is an assumption.  All of these 
approaches afford us the ability to draw analogies.   
 
The final item in codifying assumptions is possibly more challenging.  Laying down a 
number to explain your level of confidence is a difficult feat without resorting to a totally 
subjective (if not trivial) assessment.  In other words, it can be extremely difficult for 
people to interpret their ‘gut feeling’ of trust and turn that into a number that can be used 
in computational reasoning.  There are several approaches that can be used to help 
ground a confidence score in reality.  We could use the reliability of the means by which 
the evidence for the assumption was drawn.  For example, if the assumption relies upon 
sensor information from a sensor with 98% reliability, then that 0.98 can contribute to the 
confidence in that data on a reasonable way.  For evidence gathered in a non-mechanical 
way, we could abstract this point of view into an overall framework for trust 
measurement.  We can examine the history of the source as an accurate one, assigning a 
number to the percentage of correct information items.  We can use an evidence 
combining theory (such as Dempster-Schaefer) to coalesce the overall reputation of the 
source, by using the trust of other individuals in this source.  There are a variety of 
methods by which we could assign trust to a source. 
 
Several things within a situation, or world state, can be easily quantified.  What is present 
and in what quantity, the temperature outside, the altitude of terrain, etc.  Several 
challenges befall us, however, when we start seeking to model less easily visible and 
concrete things.  Social dynamics, public opinion, cultural factors, etc. can present 
considerable challenges.  Several opportunities exist for analogies, especially since 
simple similarity metrics can work well for the easily quantifiable aspects of a situation.  
A more thorough structural analysis could be performed for other types of information, 
such as social networks. 
 
In an abstract sense, we can imagine a plan to be a collection of objectives and the actions 
that will be undertaken to satisfy those objectives.  However, other information can be 
stored to give a plan more meat on its bones.  Cost, for example, is an important factor 
when choosing one plan over another.  The effects of the plan, beyond those that satisfy 
the objectives, are also important to track. 
 
The things that we can model about an action include who is performing the action, what 
resources they are using, where they are located, when the action is carried out, and what 
effect the action has.  Basically, while codifying an action, you can ask all the basic 
questions: who, what, when, where, why, and how. 
 
In many ways, Events are a lot like Actions.  However, the key difference between them 
is that the events we observe are performed by other people with their own, unknown 
agendas.  Essentially, we can ask all of the same questions we can with an action, except 
for ‘why’.  Because we cannot know the exact motives of another person, the reason for 
their action is always an assumption. 
 The outcome of the plan can be a fairly straightforward thing to capture, in the short term.  
The objectives that were satisfied, the resources expended, and the assumptions that 
panned out: these are all fairly straightforward things.  However, some aspects of an 
outcome are not so easy to capture.  For example, what plans or actions cannot be taken 
due to the result of this plan (opportunity cost)?  Beyond that, what are the second and 
tertiary effects of this plan?  How long should I pay attention to possible effects from my 
plan?  These are all deep concerns when trying to determine the efficacy of a plan.  What 
seems like a good outcome now, might actually pan out into a disaster down the road. 
 
Now, let’s examine the object oriented structure that we can seek to place this 
information into to create an episode representation.  We examined specifically the Core 
Plan Representation, developed under DARPA and the ARPI initiative. 
 
Core Plan Representation 
 
In order to facilitate sharing information between different planning systems, an effort 
was undertaken to develop a common plan representation (Pease 1996).  Through several 
iterations, the effort spawned several innovative ideas in knowledge representation for 
war planning, as well as various iterations for an object oriented plan representation.  The 
fourth version of the Core Plan Representation (CPR) is now documented on 
TekKnowlege’s website, and includes feedback from comments made throughout the 
effort’s history (Pease 1998). 
 
The CPR work has given us a huge amount of foundational knowledge to work from in 
developing an episodic representation.  Most interestingly, since the effort includes a 
large amount of documentation, we can open up the design process and pick apart 
differences between each version.  In doing this, we can adapt CPR to our specific needs. 
 
Figures from the 1996 release and the 1998 release are available in Appendix A.  These 
class diagrams will be examined and adapted to provide an episodic representation, using 
the best contributions from each version. 
 
Adapting CPR 
 
Although the Core Plan Representation was evolved over the years of its study, we found 
it necessary to understand the overall flow of the representation, rather than just the 
finished product.  This required that we examine several iterations of the representation, 
ranging in chronology from 1996 to 1998.  From the disparate but highly related versions, 
we were able to pick apart various ideas in knowledge representation and customize how 
we wanted our episodic representation to operate.  Because of the nature of the ARPI 
work, several elements of the representation were open to further growth and change, 
giving CPR the flexibility we required to apply it to the task of representing cases in 
mixed-initiative planning.  Remember that the point of this representation is to allow a 
computer to understand the episode for the sake of reasoning, as well as capturing the 
experience of a human planner. 
 Moving forward chronologically, there were several intriguing elements from the initial 
1996 report on CPR that are highly interesting and potentially very useful.  Namely, the 
inclusion of Facts and Assumptions, which are subclasses of Annotation, help the planner 
and computer understand the subtle nature of the source of information.  Rather than 
simply tacking on information to an encapsulated element in planning, it can be 
understood more concretely that information is either derived from evidence with 
certainty (a Fact) or something the human planner believes is true (an Assumption).  This 
allows the computer-based reasoning to understand how confident it can be in handling 
the information. 
 
In the same token, the inclusion of Imprecision and Uncertainty in the 1996 version is 
very important to further articulating the confidence in information.  Although the ARPI 
group admitted that the exact nature of modeling Imprecision and Uncertainty were wider 
spanning research topics than they were willing to tackle, the inclusion of the classes 
themselves leaves the opportunity to expand upon the idea.  By including a concrete 
representation of the doubt of the source of information (Uncertainty) and the doubt in 
the exactness of the information itself (Imprecision), we can carry these ideas forward by 
utilizing Fuzzy Logic.  In other words, even though it is difficult to capture Imprecision 
and Uncertainty, there are paths by which a computer can understand them 
mathematically in terms of its internal reasoning using Fuzzy Logic. 
 
From the 1998 version, we can see the addition of a super-class for all represented plan 
elements called PlanObject.  This is a very useful addition, since the Object Oriented 
nature of the model lends itself well to these types of generalizations.  In other words, 
now that we have a common parent class to all planning elements, we can understand the 
structure as a more flexible one.  PlanObjects now exist in relationships, specialized for 
their specific function, but the fields and methods they have in common can now be 
understood from the perspective of one class.  This also aids in implementation, since 
writing code once for all represented PlanObjects when they all have something in 
common is simply more efficient. 
 
Another welcome addition from the 1998 version is SpatialSpec.  It defines a location 
where an action takes place.  However, the current structure allots only one SpatialSpec 
per Action.  In reality however, thinking from a non-geospatial point of view, every 
Action can take place in a huge variety of places.  Not only can an action take place on 
the ground, but also in cyberspace, in the realm of a political structure, on the lines of a 
power grid, or any other huge variety of ‘places’ that are defined by the context of the 
action.  Because of this, SpatialSpec will need to be dealt with specifically in terms of 
adapting the concept to fit this thinking. 
 
An especially useful addition from the 1998 version of CPR is Role.  Using Role, we can 
understand the exact part that is played by the action.  Using this information, we can 
easily draw analogies for that Action by looking for Actions with similar Roles.  In other 
words, by understanding what function an action played in the overall scheme of an 
operation (such as ‘Fire Support’ or ‘Transport’), we can make a quick and efficient 
search in the case-base to find similar actions based on what role they accomplished.  Using this mentality, deeper pruning of those results are possible, because the ‘first cut’ 
of the Actions are already known to perform the role that is needed.  This will become 
clearer in terms of the MAC/FAC algorithm, and the establishment of partial orders to 
use similarity on qualitative values, both explained later. 
 
A final, especially useful contribution from 1998 is the Entity class.  This class allows 
Actors, Resources, and Roles to interrelate to each other.  In other words, we can view 
one item from a variety of perspectives by allowing Entity to ‘bridge the gap’ between its 
various facets.  While one real-world item may be considered an Actor and Resource, for 
example, we can model it as an Entity, and treat 
Actor and Resource as ‘perspectives’ on that single 
item.  This is an exciting opportunity to model 
highly complex and subtle items without the 
limitations of only one of the three perspectives.   
This also allows us to create more perspectives with 
the ability to interrelate them in the overall CPR 
scheme. 
 
Now that we’ve identified specific items within the 
Core Plan Representation that are particularly 
interesting, we can work to expand the 
representation to encompass an entire episode of an 
experience, rather than just the plan itself.  As 
discussed before, we need to adapt CPR to 
represent the Situation, Objectives, Assumptions, 
Plan, Actions, Events, and Outcome of an 
experience.  Figure N shows the level to which we 
need to change CPR to allow it to represent whole 
episodes.  Some features need to be adjusted, 
meaning that they already exist and simply need to 
be customized.  Other features need to be 
articulated, which means that they exist, but not to a sufficient degree of fidelity or 
development, thusly requiring further research and refinement to use.  Other features still 
need to be created, meaning that they go outside the scope of the original CPR context, 
thusly requiring that they be made from scratch. 
 
New classes in CPR 
 
Outcome 
 
To represent more than just the plan involved in a military operation, CPR needed to be 
adapted to show the whole story: from the planning, to the action, to the results.  This 
would allow us to model a whole experience; one that can be stored as an episode for the 
purposes of Episodic Reasoning.  In order to capture results, the Outcome class was 
created. 
 Keeping track of the success or failure of an experience is a tricky thing.  There are many 
important things to consider.  Not only are the goals the endeavor was undertaken with 
important, but also the costs of following that particular plan.  It’s not only a matter of 
success, but also of pragmatic impetus.  In terms of comparing one plan to another, shear 
accomplishment of goals leaves no basis to discern.  In order to track the many and 
varied possible costs of a plan, a second new class (contained within Outcome) can be 
created called simply Cost. 
 
However, tracking the objectives achieved and cost incurred is not the entire outcome 
either.  Forcing the adversary to spend their resources is also an important factor in the 
success of a military operation.  This is especially so in terms of Fourth Generation 
Warfare, where affecting the will of the adversary can be strongly influenced by the 
effect of their own costs.  Knowing the red line past which an enemy will not spend any 
more to oppose you is vital to developing plans and strategies over time.  For these 
reasons, not only the commanders’ own costs, but also the cost of their adversaries should 
be tracked. 
 
In the same grain of responding to important measures of outcome in military planning, 
another key area of this type of planning is the effective use of good intelligence to 
produce valid assumptions about the situation.  For example, if a patrol tells you that they 
spotted ten enemy troops at the top of the next hill, your planning should reflect this 
observation.  In fact, this observation could be an indicator of something else not yet 
seen.  For example, seeing ten troops might indicate that there is an enemy base nearby, 
or that there are one hundred more troops waiting to march once they know the way is 
clear, or that there is a convoy out of gas ahead with ten hitchhikers looking for a gas 
station, etc.  One piece of information could spawn thousands of assumptions.  It is up to 
a good commander to make the best assumptions possible given the situation.  At the 
very least, in this example, there are ten enemy troops on or near the next hill.  This piece 
of information already can influence planning, without a terribly wide leap of faith.   
Either present more force to the hill to prepare for an enemy force, or avoid that hill all 
together.  At least you know that the hill is not empty, if nothing else.  Keeping track of a 
commander’s assumptions and the degree to which they were actually true is a good way 
to capture one of the essential skills in good planning.  Since CPR already includes the 
Assumptions class, simply maintaining a collection of them within the Outcome class, 
along with corresponding truth values, is adequate to take the truthfulness of assumptions 
into account. 
 
Another important piece of the planning puzzle is to know what you could have done if 
you had not undertaken this particular plan.  Some opportunities are particular, and don’t 
come knocking again.  Time constraints, resources limitations, etc. leave only a certain 
window of opportunity for many plans.  This opportunity cost should be taken into 
account when recording an experience.  Squandering useful opportunities can have a 
huge impact on the success of an overall campaign.  To keep track of these costs, we can 
use the existing CPR objects of Plan and Action to keep track of full plans or single 
actions that cannot be undertaken because of the events unfolding in this experience.  Of 
course, many of these cannot simply be known at the outset, so these should only be stored if they were already prepared plans that are now impossible, or obviously actions 
that were noted to be operationally advantageous that are now impossible. 
 
With these four main areas (Objectives, Costs, Assumptions, and Opportunity Cost) in 
play, we can now begin to develop the Outcome class, which will extend PlanObject.  
This is shown below in Figure 3. 
 
Outcome 
ObjectivesMet : Objective 
ObjectivesFailed : Objective 
FriendlyCost : Cost 
AdversaryCost : Cost 
AssumptionsTrue : Assumption 
AssumptionsFalse : Assumption 
OpportunityCostP : Plan 
OpportunityCostA : Action 
 
Using this class as a single point of collection for various types of information about the 
success or failure of a military plan allows objective scoring mechanisms to examine the 
case from their own perspective.  For example, if a member of the Red Cross was looking 
at a plan, they may gauge the success of the experience as a function of casualties and 
medical supplies used.  From a different perspective, an intelligence collector may gauge 
the success of a plan based on what information sources have become unavailable 
because of the plan compared to how many new information sources were 
created/revealed.  The success of a plan is all a matter of perspective; however each 
perspective requires similar kinds of information with which to establish the context. 
 
Going beyond simply storing information, we can apply some forms of objective scoring.  
If someone were looking at this plan not from a specific point of view, but rather from a 
broad and general sense, they may want to see some overall measures of this experience’s 
success.  To accomplish this, we can look at how important each element was to the 
commander’s vision of the plan.  For example, if certain objectives were more important 
that others, they will simply have a higher weight.  If certain assumptions are more 
critical and certain than others, they could have a higher weight.  Then, when determining 
the overall, general success of the experience, we can simply use those weights to 
determine the ratio between what elements were successful and not successful.  In other 
words, we can take a simple ratio to see which of the most important objectives were met.  
We can apply the same sort of reasoning to costs.  Applying a weight to resources can 
allow us to judge by simple ratio the comparative cost between commander and 
adversary.  Constructing ratios based on importance gives a way to examine the success 
of the plan in terms of what the commander doing the planning deemed important.  These 
ratios can provide a quantitative way to broadly look at the success of a plan.  This can be 
used to scan through an experience base quickly to ‘weed out’ certain plans, and focus 
attention on others based on success in one or more areas.  You can look at highly 
effective plans, in terms of accomplishing goals.  Also you could seek out plans with 
good use of judgment and intelligence information with a high rate of true assumptions.  You can look for plans with a cost ratio that is very high; plans that are exceptionally 
costly to the adversary.  Or you could look for plans that leave your options the most 
open for future planning.  Feasibly, using these weighted scores you could aggregate 
them to find the best overall plan (by the numbers). 
 
Cost 
 
Being able to tell how much a plan costs is an important factor in plan selection.   
However, the current version of Core Plan Representation has no way to take this into 
account.  We must first understand what cost is, in this context.  Cost is a resource that 
was expended to enable your own actions.  Cost differs from simple negative effects in 
that it implies expenditure in something that you already own and control (in some way).  
In this context, costs can be expected to occur, or could arise unexpectedly, but all pertain 
to resources that are under your command.  In a sense, cost is an element of control, 
because the resources expended to enable your actions can be perceived as a management 
of risk.  Being able to perform a cost-benefit analysis gives a potential plan further 
context.  Representing those costs in our plan representation further enables reasoning 
upon plans and cases.  However, this challenge is two pronged.  First, we must be able to 
represent costs themselves.  Next, we must be able to differentiate between expected 
costs and real costs. 
 
In order to represent costs, we must first examine the variety of things that could be 
expended in the course of a plan.  Then, we must have the ability to understand the level 
of fidelity with which we can model those various factors in regards to the level of 
fidelity of the overall plan.  For example, although employing a tank in battle requires 
fuel, ammunition, and other supplies, those materiel items were all at some point 
purchased.  From that abstract perspective, you can express that cost in simple dollars and 
cents.  However, from a more concrete perspective, if the tank needs to be deployed 
rapidly, and purchasing that fuel would take more time that you have, then you need to 
rely on the materiel on hand to accomplish a task.  From that angle, it’s not the dollars 
you spent that counts, but rather the value of the actual materiel in terms of its limited 
supply.  The logistical ability expended to attain supplies in that case is worth more than 
the actual cost of the materiel itself in a vacuum.  Depending upon the situation, there is a 
difference between the simple dollar cost and the value of the materiel used in a plan. 
 
Extending the scope of this kind of thinking, simple dollars and cents aren’t even enough 
to explain the variety of costs that can be incurred during a plan.  Casualties, for example, 
are one of the hardest costs in warfare.  Since every human life is important, how can we 
simply attach a dollar value to it?  Another cost that could be incurred could be expressed 
in terms of political capitol.  Sometimes when you have to call in a favor, you might find 
your relationship with that person strained.  You obviously can’t put a dollar amount on 
someone’s trust, respect, or friendship.  Obviously, we must examine methods of 
qualifying and quantifying cost that go beyond simple monetary exchanges. 
 
This is a good opportunity to use the PMESII framework to help conceptualize the 
different kind of costs that can be incurred by a plan.  
Dimension  Types of Costs 
Political  Primacy of your control over the situation 
Military Casualties,  Logistics  stock expended, Equipment lost, etc. 
Economic Money  expended 
Social  Relationships strained (with others, public, leadership, etc.) 
Information  Intel revealed to adversary 
Infrastructure Transportation  means  inhibited 
 
From a political point of view, the costs you could incur from a plan would have to do 
with your control over the situation.  Do you have the support of your superiors?  Are 
coalition partners cooperating?  Do local civil authorities allow you to operate?  Are they 
cooperative?  Does your own force still adhere to your command?  These concerns are 
primarily concerned with relationships, but of an official rather than personal nature.  The 
parties concerned could still trust and respect you, but their political obligations drive 
their behavior otherwise. 
 
Costs from the military perspective are fairly simple and straightforward.  Casualties, 
materiel consumed, and the like are easily quantifiable and have been used as metric for 
cost throughout military history. 
 
The same goes for costs from the economic perspective.  Tracking the money spent on an 
operation is a straightforward process. 
 
Costs from the social perspective can create a considerable challenge in terms of 
measurability.  Sometimes it is hard to gauge if public support is on your side, or if 
morale is at a certain level, or if the contacts in your rolodex are really behind you.  
Capturing and quantifying that kind of information can be difficult, if not entirely 
subjective.  However, using technologies like Social Network Analysis, this seemingly 
impossible task can be accomplished. 
 
Measuring cost from the information perspective can be both challenging, but also fairly 
straightforward at the same time.  It’s straightforward because you generally know what 
sort of information you had to make known in some way in the course of carrying out 
your plan.  It can be challenging because you have no idea what other people perceive of 
that information.  In other words, you may know full well you had to use an otherwise 
unknown capability in order to surprise an opponent, but you don’t know if the opponent 
realized that’s what was going on.  On the other side, you may believe you are operating 
quite unpredictably, but a clever opponent has determined something about your patterns 
and doctrine through several observations.  It’s hard to tell what exactly another person 
knows.  In the face of this uncertainty, perhaps the best way to track information cost is 
to understand what information you know that you are making known, assuming the 
adversary has perceived it. 
 Costs from an infrastructure perspective are also fairly straightforward to measure, much 
like military and economic costs.  All that is required is the overall capabilities in 
infrastructure that existed before, and how the plan has inhibited that in any way. 
 
Event 
 
One of the major drawbacks of the Core Plan Representation was its lack of support for 
representing red force actions.  In other words, although it had all sort of things in mind 
for planning from your own perspective, it had no support for tracking what you believed 
an adversary might do, or what they actually did.  To alleviate this, we took an approach 
that used similar classes for modeling assumptions about the adversary, and actual 
adversary actions.  In this section, we will discuss modeling actual adversary actions 
using adaptations to Core Plan Representation. 
 
Under this approach, a new class very similar to Plan was formulated, called Event.  
Event is used to hold information about what actions some other group undertook, 
without direct knowledge of their intentions or world state.  In this sense, it is similar to 
Plan, but trimmed down to accommodate the lack of knowledge of the observed group’s 
subjective universe.   
 
Location 
 
In order to model concepts of location that are not strictly geo-spatial, we had to explore 
what sort of construct could be used to represent SpatialSpec in CPR.  As you remember, 
each Action can contain only one SpatialSpec.  Therefore, we are left with two options.  
First, we could store more data inside of SpatialSpec as to leave a place for the many and 
varied aspects of location that we could conceive.  Second, we could alleviate the 
restriction in the Action class by allowing it to store any number of instances of 
information to denote locations.  Because it is not known how many different aspects of a 
location might be modeled a priori, we decided that each class should store only one type.  
This makes each instance highly cohesive, since it only stores data on one aspect of 
location.  Therefore, we lifted the restriction on the Action class, allowing it to store any 
n SpatialSpec.  Also, because of the changed nature of the SpatialSpec, to allow several 
different aspects of locations to be modeled, we also renamed the class Location.  
 
Now, let’s examine some ways we can facilitate the reasoning upon these experiences 
using meaning and analogies to better facilitate the CBR process. 
 
Meaningful Information 
 
Determining what information a computer can understand is one of the biggest challenges 
facing knowledge representation.  Given the vast pattern matching and semantic abilities 
of the human brain, it can be difficult to prune out what exactly can be understood by an 
entity without any ability to intuit context, subtlety, or inferred meaning.  However, given 
the field of military planning, we have at least a stepping stone into forming information 
that can be reasoned upon by a computer.  The challenge is: how do we ourselves understand the context of military planning in such a way that can be operationalized by 
both a computer and a human in mixed-initiative planning?  That is, how can we make 
military planning information understandable to a computer, without condensing it to the 
point of losing its human meaning? 
 
One of the biggest challenges in the traditional computing world is qualitative 
information.  Computers are great with arithmetic, and humans enjoy the concreteness 
afforded by ‘pinning down’ something numerically, but how to we reconcile that to a 
world that refuses to be pinned down?  Determining qualitative information, that is taking 
an abstract concept and acknowledging a discernable concrete quality or trait, is a 
powerful human ability.  Even so, not every situation affords the opportunity even to 
surmise qualitative inferences.  Every day humans are faced with situations where they 
can’t just pin things down in the chaos, so how can we expect computers to be any better? 
 
One way we can begin to understand qualitative information is in relative terms.  In other 
words, whether we say ‘big’ or ‘small’ we are talking about two values in terms of size.  
These two terms are relative; we would not know what things were big unless there were 
things that were small to compare them to.  This brings up the crux of the approach, that 
the two values are comparable.  Given that they are, we can set up an ordering scheme 
(either strict or partial ordering depending upon the situation) that a computer could 
understand. 
 
Another way to allow a computer to understand qualitative information is taking the 
simplest approach possible.  That is allowing each and every piece of information to be 
tagged with qualities.  These qualities would be simple strings that could be compared 
directly, or arranged in a taxonomy that would allow them to be compared in terms of 
pre-determined meaning.  In other words, we can create a dictionary of qualities, and 
arrange them in some reasonable tree (or graph) that allows them to carry meaning in 
terms to their relationships with each other.  This, of course, would require tremendous 
space and effort to create.  However, there is already ongoing ontological research that 
covers this arena of knowledge representation extensively (e.g. Cyc). 
 
Analogies 
 
An important area of research in artificial intelligence is the field of understanding and 
forming analogies.  In a sense, our power to create relationships between symbols, 
experiences, and situations is at the root of our ability to apply that experience to our 
everyday life.  We would not know what experiences were valid to draw upon if we did 
not know how to relate the past to the present.  In the same token, we would not know 
how to adapt those situations to the present context if it were not for that same power.  
Thus, if we are to truly accomplish mixed-initiative planning, we need to understand how 
to enable a computer to draw analogies. 
 
There are several approaches we can take.  If we think for a moment, we can easily 
conceive of why two items, say apples and oranges are actually similar.  There are 
several ways to approach that similarity, most notable three.  
First, apples and oranges share some similar physical characteristics.  They are both 
sweet, both about the same size, and both have an outer skin.  We can examine those 
characteristics through measurement and observation.  In this same sense, if we are trying 
to draw an analogy in war planning, we can say that a WWII-era Sherman tank and a 
modern M1A Abrahams tank are similar.  Both have guns, both have treads, and both 
have crews of more than one person.  They share these characteristics, which we can 
determine through an examination of the two items.  This of course takes not only time, 
but also the ability to measure those characteristics.  All of this is under the assumption 
that the two sets of characteristics can even be compared. 
 
A second approach to determining if apples and oranges are similar is examining them 
not by looking at their attributes, but how they are organized and classified in various 
taxonomies.  In this example, apples and oranges can both be classified as ‘fruits’, so in 
this sense they are similar.  They can also both be classified as member of the plant 
kingdom, although they are from different (phylum?) genuses.  In this sense, the two are 
similar, but not as similar as they could be.  From this perspective, knowing the 
taxonomical structure of how we classify plants and animals gives us the ability to 
granulate the level to which two things are similar.  In this context, cats and dogs would 
be more similar than cats and bamboo plants.  Because cats and dogs share a common 
classification that is at a deeper level of the taxonomy, we can consider them more 
similar.  The asset of this approach is that we don’t need to be able to measure of 
compare the attributes of the items to be matched, as long as they are already classified in 
some taxonomical structure.  This is also the drawback of this approach; items must 
already be classified, or else you must find a way to classify them yourself, which would 
require an examination of its attributes (which returns you to the first approach).  A 
military planning example of this would be determining that our Sherman and Abrahams 
tanks are again similar, because they are both classified as Main Battle Tanks.  In this 
sense, the Sherman and the Abrahams are more similar to each other than the Abrahams 
and the F-16 are, because the F-16 is a fighter jet and not a Main Battle Tank. 
 
However, following these two approaches blindly may not be enough to adequately make 
analogies.  A fighter jet and a main battle tank actually do share some things in common, 
even if they are classified differently.  Both are able to lay destruction upon targets.  Both 
are capable of being a show of force.  Both are capable of protecting soldiers (and 
airmen) from harm.  Even though both items may go about these capabilities differently, 
they can in a sense be interchanged for each other in the proper situation.  Examining not 
just the physical characteristics of an item is not enough for drawing analogies.   
Especially in military planning, where using available resources to utilize a capability is 
supremely important.  It is not as important that you have two similar vehicles, what is 
important is that the mission is accomplished effectively.   
 
Pulling away from an equipment-centric point of view, even two different approaches can 
be analogous to each other if they accomplish the same effect.  For example, a show of 
force flight, a pamphlet drop, and a bombing run might actually all accomplish the same goal.  Knowing this allows the commander to plan in such a way that optimizes costs, 
benefits, and risk to make more effective decisions. 
 
We can, then, examine analogies not simply as the similarity between the objects 
involved, but in terms of capabilities and effects.  From this perspective, analogies are 
drawn based on what you want to accomplish, not just on the attributes that you can 
examine.  Going deeper, we can think of those capabilities and effects as relationships 
between the actor and the affected.  If we know the relationship we desire, and the target 
object, we know what sorts of capabilities are required to satisfy that relationship.  From 
this, we can draw analogies from our past experiences to see what exact items have 
satisfied this relationship in the past. 
 
Structural Mapping 
 
Important work in this style of analogy building has been ongoing.  One interesting 
algorithm is the Structural Mapping Algorithm, invented by Diedre Gentner and Ken 
Forbus (Forbus et al. 1989).  This algorithm relies on forming an analogy not just on the 
objects involved, but rather on their relationship to each other.  In other words, SME 
utilizes the structure of a representation, rather than simply the attributes of the 
constituent parts. 
 
More specifically, SME seeks to make analogies that adhere to the systematicity 
principle, which stipulates that matches are preferred when they involve higher-order 
relations rather than several lower-order facts.  In other words, SME matches based not 
only on attribute matches (like similarity), but more importantly on true analogy, where 
the matching elements fit into a system. 
 
Many are Called, Few are Chosen 
 
An interesting approach to drawing analogies in an efficient and interesting way is the 
Many are Called but Few are Chosen (MAC/FAC) approach designed by Gentner and 
Forbus from Northwestern University (Gentner & Forbus 1994).  It combines a speedy 
similarity based approach with a deeper structural matching approach to optimize 
analogy drawing.  This approach is interesting in two ways.  First, it can make episodic 
reasoning more efficient in terms of matching and retrieval.  Second, the approach itself 
can help a commander understand his or her priorities in planning.  Let us first briefly 
describe the approach itself, and then this important second benefit.  After, we will 
explore various ways the approach could be adapted in novel ways, prompting future 
research. 
 
In the MAC stage, each case is assigned a vector of numbers.  This vector contains the 
number of occurrences of a given description of functors (predicates, functions, 
connectives) contained within the case.  In other words, if a description contained 
[DESTROYS, BIG], then each case would be assigned a vector that simply counted the 
number of occurrences of the function DESTROYS and the predicate BIG in the case.  
This is done regardless of the structure of the case; it is simply a count.  Then, the MAC chooser takes a look at the vectors compared with the description and selects the best 
match and everything within 10% of that.  These cases are passed onto the FAC stage to 
examine their structure. 
 
In the FAC stage, the pruned case-base is subjected to structural matching with the 
current situation, as with the traditional Structural Matching approach, using similarity 
based matching.  The combination of the two approaches allows the otherwise thorough 
and possibly costly Structural Matching algorithm to operate in a concise and focused 
way; eliminating wasteful work.  However, the MAC/FAC approach operates on the 
assumption that a ‘first-pass’ with a desired description will eliminate cases with little 
value to the case to be matched.  Bear in mind that if this assumption does not hold, then 
there is a possibility to prematurely eliminating useful results.  However, Gentner and 
Forbus’ experiments with the algorithm are suggestive that it is well-founded. 
 
Summary 
 
Case-based reasoning is a method by which we can use the past to determine possible 
solutions to a problem.  However, the foundation of a good case-based reasoner is a solid 
case-base.  Formalizing how an experience is captured, stored, and reasoned upon is the 
brick and mortar upon which a potentially powerful decision aide could be built.  By 
exploring and adapting existing plan representation work, we can formalize a case 
structure for military planning.  Then, by employing analogy-based matching algorithms, 
we can begin to understand how to make insightful connections between the past and the 
present, in order to shape the future. 
 
Future Work 
 
Further research into this topic can branch into formalizing the measurement of trust and 
confidence in information for making assumptions, determining the right level of fidelity 
in information capturing to ensure good case matches, determining the best way to 
capture a world state for provide context, methods by which to capture cases from written 
(or lived) historic war stories, and a variety of other areas. 
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